A second element in this phase

The objective, as I understood it, was to improve upon the agreed framework Rosetta Stone Language in these discussions to most significantly add the North Korean conventional force deployment to our list of concerns but also to go to what the Clinton administration had been after, namely, the ballistic missile program of North Korea as well as the nuclear program and go after their export, their deployment, their production and their testing.And finally, to resurrect a word from the past, to emphasize verification of whatever arrangements were agreed upon. A second element in this phase, too, I think, was the continuation of rather negative rhetoric about North Korea, notwithstanding a declaratory position that we were prepared to negotiate.Some unhappy things were said about the leadership in North Korea, accurate, perhaps, but not flattering, and there was certainly no suggestion, as we talked about our willingness to show up for talks, that the administration was prepared to engage in inducements, positive inducements to bring the North a long a road that we had defined as wanting to take with the North Koreans. I think this phase lasted also about six months. And then we got to January, and we got to the State Of The Union speech, and that well-known speech, with a well-known phrase, I want to read just that sentence. States like these, President Bush said, and he was referring, as you know, to Iran, Iraq and North Korea, and their terrorist allies. And their terrorist allies. Repetition added here. Constitute an Language Learning Software access of evil in aiming to threaten the peace of the world. What happened, I think, in phase three, is that North Korea was, and other rogues were linked to the threat posed by terrorists. There was a recognition, I think, more broadly after September 11th that the United States was moving into a new phase of vulnerability that had not been expected, in which we had not had experience for a very long time. We had against these terrorists no deterrence and no defense. We had no deterrence and no defense against a strategic threat to the continental United States. The newness of this, I think, is extremely important to understand, where the administration is currently. I would say, we hadn't, the United States hadn't been in this position since about 1812. After 1812, through much of the 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century, the United States had oceans and competent navies and friends, or, at least, non-threats in the North and South. And so, we were able, in fact, to defend the United States and to use the phrase from the strategic literature, defend by denial, to actually prevent states from reaching our shores, our enemies from reaching us. With World War Two and the aftermath, that changed, of course, and we had air power, that could attack the navies and span the oceans, and we had nuclear weapons, a few of which could fundamentally alter American history. And we had a vulnerability that we were unhappy with. And, so, we developed a lot of Korean Learning Software nuclear weapons, a lot of offensive capability to deal with that.